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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




JOE OLIVER, WILLIAM JAMES, 
and ORSON D. SPENCER, 
Pla.intiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
LINCOLN HANKS, 
Defendant arnd Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9898 
Defendant and Respondent's 
Answering Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action is brought for specific performance of an 
alleged oral agreement to sell stock to the plaintiffs. The 
applicable law is the statute of frauds of the State of 
Colorado which holds that such an agreement is void. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The statements made by the plaintiff-appellants re-
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The pretrial judge, on October 18, 1962, framed the 
issues in the case. At the pretrial counsel for defend-
ant-respondent Hanks urged that the plaintiffs could 
not recover as a matter of law because the alleged con-
tract was void under Colorado law. 
Counsel for plaintiff-appellants was not prepared to 
present law on this point and the pretrial judge stated 
that since it was then after 5:00 o'clock p.m., and the 
matter was a complex one, the issues would be framed 
and the matter could be brought before the court on a 
motion for summary judgment or on further pretrial at 
a later date. 
On March 8, 1963, the matter was brought on for fur-
ther pretrial (R. 19) and the pretrial judge called for 
complete memorandums of the law with regard to the 
statute of frauds issue which were prepared by both 
counsel. (R. 41-44; R. 45-53; R. 56-62; R. 66-71; R. 72-80.) 
On March 19, 1963, the pretrial judge granted de-
fendant-respondent's motion for summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action relating to the 
alleged oral agreement and ruled that even if said agree-
ment was made as alleged by the plaintiff-appellants, it 
would be void under Colorado law. 
The pretrial judge did not overrule the prior pre-
trial order as stated at page 4 of plaintiff-appellants' 
brief. The further pretrial was clearly a "Supple-
mental Pretrail" (R. 19) for the purpose of giving full 
consideration to the defense of the statute of frauds 
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raised by the defendant. Counsel for plaintiff-appellants 
at no time objected to the further pretrial and was as 
anxious to have the issue determined before trial as was 
defendant-respondent's counsel until the court ruled 
against him. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks a decision from this 
court sustaining the ruling of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-respondent, Lincoln Hanks, was em-
ployed to assist Life Assurance Company of the vV est, a 
Colorado insurance company, in organizing a sales force 
and assisting in the sale of an issue of stock to residents 
of the State of Colorado. 
The plaintiff-appellants were salesmen employed by 
the insurance company to sell the stock. The salesmen 
all executed contracts with the company under the terms 
by which they were to receive 10% of the gross sales price 
on all stock sold by them. A copy of said contract was 
stipulated to and included in the record. (R. 63, 64) 
At a subsequent time Hanks made an agreement with 
the salesmen to contribute a sum equal to 2% of the 
gross sales price of the stock sold by them if : 
(a) They performed all terms of this agreement 
with the company. 
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(b) If they stayed to the end of the company's un-
derwriting. (See copy of this agreement stipulated into 
the record, R. 65.) 
On April 22, 1961, several months after the plaintiffs 
had made their agreements with the company and with 
Hanks, the plaintiffs met in Denver, Colorado, at which 
place a further agreement was made. The parties disa-
gree as to the terms of this agreement. Plaintiff-appel- ~i: 
lants claim that at this meeting Hanks agreed to sell ~1 
them 6,666 shares of stock in the company at $.35 per ~~ 
share and that this agreement was unconditional. Hanks !~ 
contends the offer was conditional on the men staying 
with him on future underwritings for three years and that 
the stock would be held in trust for three years and then 
divided among those who performed this condition. 
The parties, however, have stipulated, and the pre-
trial judge made it a part of the pretrial order, that the 
agreement was, whatever its terms, made in Colorado. 
"6. The parties further agree that on April 
22, 1961, there was an oral agreement between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant, which agreement 
was made at Denver, Colorado." (R. 18) 
The plaintiff-appellants further agreed, and the pre-
trial order provides, that the agreement, even under the 
terms as plaintiff-appellants contend them to be, was not 
to be performed sooner than thirteen months from the 
date it was made. 
"5. The parties further agree that the bonus 
stock was not to be available for purchase by the 
plaintiffs prior to May 21, 1962. '' (R. 18) 
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The statement that Hanks accepted money from two 
of the plaintiffs (Page 8, appellants' brief) is not true. 
Those two men, as a preliminary to filing suit, tendered 
the purchase price of one-eighth of the stock by deliver-
ing their checks to Hanks. Hanks did not accept this 
tender and the checks were never cashed. 
Prior to the end of the offering the plaintiff-appel-
lants terminated their relationship with the defendant-
respondent and elected to enter into new contracts with 
the company which granted them the 5% which de-
fendant-respondent Hanks was to receive under the terms 
of his agreement. 
Other of the facts set forth by plaintiff-appellants are 
inaccurate but are of no consequence on this appeal since 
the only question before the court is whether the agree-
ment sued upon is within the Colorado statute of frauds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN 
RULING THAT THE AGREEMENT SUED 
UPON, EVEN IF MADE AS ALLEGED, WAS 
VOID SINCE IT WOULD VIOLATE THE 
COLORADO STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The alleged agreement sued upon is governed by the 
law of the State of Colorado. Title 59-1-12 of the Colo-
rado Revised Statutes, 1953, makes such an agreement 
void on two grounds. (1) That by the terms of the agree-
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ment it was not to be performed within one year from the 
making thereof, and (2) That it is a contract for the sale 
of a thing in action for the price of $50.00 or more. 
The C_olorado statute governing this contract reads 
as follows: 
'' V orn AGREEMENTS. - In the following cases 
every agreement shall be void, unless such agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in 
writing and subscribed by the party charged 
therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by the terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the mak-
ing thereof ... 
( 4) Every contract for the sale of any goods, 
chattels, or things in action, for the price of fifty 
dollars or more, shall be void, unless : 
(a) A note or memorandum of such con-
tract be made in writing, and be subscribed 
by the parties to be charged therewith; or, 
(b) Unless the buyer shall accept and re-
ceive part of such goods, or the evidence of 
some of them, of such things in action ; or, 
(c) Unless the buyer, at the time, shall 
pay some part of the purchase money." 
59-1-12 C.R.S., 1953. 
It is well settled that shares of stock are ''7 ithin the 
definition of "goods, chattels or things in action, ... " 
"Under the English statute it is settled that 
choses in action are not included within the terms 
'goods, wares and merchandise.' This is true even 
though the choses in action is evidenced by a tan-
gible document, as a certificate of stock. In the 
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United States, under statutes similar to the Eng-
lish, shares of stock are held to be included." 
Williston on Sales, Sec. 67, p. 168. See also 
Wooley v. Loose, 57 U. 336, 195 P. 908. 
Plaintiff-appellants in their brief attempt to urge 
that the rule announced in the controlling Colorado case, 
Knoff v. Gra.ce, 76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526, has been watered 
down by subsequent Colorado cases and should not be 
applied. They write: ''The Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in not overruling Knoff v. Grace broke its force in 
1924 with its decision in Moore v. Bernard, 22 P. 134 ... " 
(Appellants ' Brief, page 11.) 
The subsequent cases do not in any way modify or 
''break the force'' of the Grace rule which has long been 
and now is the law in Colorado. On the contrary, the 
cases cited by plaintiff-appellants implement and apply 
the Grace rule. 
The plaintiff-appellants, while arguing under Point 
II of their brief (page 12) that the alleged agreement 
is one that by its terms can be performed within one year, 
do not contend or present any authorities tending to 
show that the agreement was not one for the sale of 
goods, chattels or things in action for a price of fifty 
dollars or more. The contract, therefore, is clearly with-
in the Colorado statute of frauds on this basis alone. 
The position taken by plaintiff-appellants must, there-
fore, fail unless there was such performance on their part 
that the statute does not bar them from recovery. 
The Colorado rule can be succinctly stated as follows : 
Performance by the party seeking to enforce an 
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agreement which otherwise would be within the statute 
of fra.uds will avoid the statute of frauds on.ly if that 
performance is inconsistent with acts which can be re-
ferable to any agreement or theory other than the one 
sought to be enforced. 
Some of the cases put the rule another way and say: 
The performance of the pa.rty seeking to take the 
contract out of the statute will only accomplish this if 
the performance is solely referable to the contract 
asserted. 
Both rules are the same and if the Colorado cases 
are carefully analyzed, it will be clear that there has 
been no retreat from this rule which was announced in 
Knoff v. Grace. 
In Knoff v. Grace, 76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526, the plain-
tiffs sued for specific performance of an oral lease for 
three years on a grocery store. The plaintiffs had 
changed their position substantially and performed un-
der the oral lease in the following respects : 
(a) Plaintiffs relying on the oral lease quit their 
jobs to run the store. 
(b) The plaintiffs formed a partnership and raised 
capital to run the store at considerable expense to them-
selves. 
(c) They remodeled the store and bought fixtures 
which they installed in the store. 
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(d) They completely stocked the store. 
(e) They took complete possession of the store. 
(f) They advertised and ran the store, developing 
customers and good will at their expense. 
(g) They paid rent to the defendant. 
The trial court held that the three year agreement 
relied upon by the defendants was void and the defend-
ants were ejected. On appeal the Supreme Court \Yas 
faced with a fact situation where it had every reason to 
lean toward the defendants. The court, in sustaining 
the trial court, made a keen analysis of the policy behind 
the statute of frauds. 
''The statute in question was passed for the 
reason that it was not safe to let proof, upon the 
questions therein referred to, rest in parol; it fol-
lows that to serve the purpose of the statute we 
must take care never so to extend the exceptions 
thereto, which are pressed upon us so constantly, 
as to let those questions become issues to be tried 
on oral testimony alone. 
While it has often been truly said that equity 
ought not to allow the statute of frauds to be used 
as an instrument of fraud or wrong, yet the stat-
ute can never be enforced without some hardship 
and wrong. Wherever there is an oral contract 
on which a party has relied, it is, in some degree, 
a wrong and hardship upon him to hold it invalid, 
and if there is no oral contract there is no room 
for the statute to act. Therefore the enforcement 
of the statute must always be, in a sense (though, 
of course, not in legal contemplation) a fraud or 
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wrong upon him against whom it is enforced.'' 
Page 527. 
The courts long ago faced the problem of whether 
it is worse to risk a fraud on a defendant by plaintiffs 
urging an oral contract or to place the burden on the one 
making a contract to obtain a memorandum in "Titing. 
Philosophical arguments can be made ad infinitum on 
this question but the matter was wisely resolved by facing 
the parties to an oral contract with the prospect of being 
denied relief in the courts if they failed to obtain a suf-
ficient writing. 
The court in the Grace case next treated the conten-
tion of the defendant-appellants that their performance, 
change of condition, and detriment should take the con-
trast out of the application of the statute and that the 
application of the statute would seriously injure the de-
fendants and aid the plaintiff in the perpetration of a 
fraud upon the defendants while to enforce the contract 
would not damage the plaintiff who would receive the 
agreed rental for the three year term. To this the court 
said: 
"It is also the rule that what is done as part 
performance must, to escape the statute, be con-
sistent with no theory other than that of the al-
leged oral lease. What is fairly referrable to 
some other cause than the contract as alleged will 
not be regarded as sufficient part performance to 
justify a decree of specific performance. Von 
Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; J en-
ning v. Miller, 48 Ore. 201, 85 P. 517; Morrison v. 
Herrick, 130 Ill. 631, 22 N.E. 537; Wood v. Thorn-
10 
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by, 58 Ill. 468; Kosh v. Nat'l. Bldg. Ass'n., 137 
Ill. 497, 27 N.E. 530. 
The reason for this rule is that an act which 
is consistent with some contract other than that 
alleged does not tend to prove the latter. 
For example, in the present case possession 
and payment of rent are as consistent with a ten-
ancy from month to month as with one of a year 
or more. So the installation of trade fixtures is 
consistent with a monthly tenancy, because the 
tenant would be obliged to install them whatever 
his tenancy ... The whole proof, therefore, is left 
to oral testimony, which is what the statute seeks 
to prevent.'' Page 528. 
The rule stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
the Grace case has not been overruled and is still the rule 
of law in Colorado. Contrary to the statement made by 
plaintiff-appellants in their brief (page 11) that the 
force of this rule was "broken" in the case of Moore v. 
Bernard, 226 P. 134 and In re Moschetti's Estate, 259 P. 
515, these cases applied the formula of the Grace case. 
In the Berna,rd case the plaintiff heir sued to reform 
a deed conveying a life estate claiming an oral agreement 
to convey the land to six heirs if they would pay $75.00/ 
month each during the life of the deceased. The six heirs 
paid $450.00 per month during the life of the deceased 
and thus fully performed their agreement and the per-
formance met the test of the Grace rule because there 
was no other agreement or theory which would explain 
the payment of the $450.00 per month and hence the per-
formance was wholly referrable to the oral contract 
sought to be enforced. 
11 
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The second case In re Moschetti's Estale, 259 P. 515, 
which plaintiff-appellants cite as "breaking the force" 
of the Grace rule likewise follows the Grace rule and 
applies it. In this case the plaintiffs sought to recover 
three-fourths of the proceeds from the sale of a lease, 
contending they had purchased the interest pursuant to 
an oral sale. The performance they relied upon was : 
(a) Payment by check of $1,500.00 for part of the 
interest. 
(b) Payment by check of three-fourths of all the 
lease rentals. 
(c) Reimbursement of three-fourths of the payments 
made by Moschetti on the mine. 
(d) Purchase of equipment for the mine. 
None of this performance was referrable to any other 
contract but the purchase agreement sought to be en-
forced and hence under the Grace rule this performance 
avoided the statute of frauds and the court correctly 
applied the Gra,ce rule and did not "break its force" as 
plaintiff-appellants state in their brief. 
The Colorado case of Rupp v. Hill, 367 P. 2d 746, 
cited at page 11 of plaintiff-appellants' brief to demon-
strate a softening of the Grace rule, does not modify the 
rule in any way, but strictly applies it. In the Hill case 
the plaintiff Rupp sought to enforce an oral agreement 
made with his co-tenant Hill to sell the plaintiff his one-
half interest in the co-tenancy for the amount of his in-
12 
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vestment, plus 10% interest. There was part perform-
ance by the plaintiff as follows : 
(a) Rupp continued in possession of the ranch with 
his family and made improvements at his own expense. 
(b) The Hills abandoned property to Rupp and 
never returned to the ranch. 
(c) A release for Hill was obtained by Rupp of any 
liability arising out of a sales contract on the ranch which 
both Rupp and Hill were parties to. (This was one of the 
conditions imposed by Hill in the Rupp-Hill oral con-
tract.) 
The trial court held that the contract was void under 
the statute of frauds and Hill appealed. The Supreme 
Court, in reversing the trial court, held : 
1. That an agreement to reduce to writing an oral 
agreement within the statute of frauds is unenforceable 
as is the agreement itself since to enforce such an agree-
ment would make a void contract indirectly enforceable. 
2. The trial court failed to consider whether or not 
the partial performance by Rupp was referrable to the 
oral contract sought to be enforced. The court was care-
ful in sending the case back for further proceedings to 
restate the Grace rule: 
''If there was a parol agreement, does pos-
session of the property by Rupp and his family 
make inapplicable the statute of frauds~ It de-
13 
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pends upon. whether such possession is referable 
to the agreement. 
Actual possession in furtherance of an oral 
contract may be made the foundation for a de-
cree of specific performance, btd such possession 
must be referrable to the contract, Von Trotha v. 
Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; 3 American Law 
of Property 31, Sec. 11.8; Whether possession is 
referrable to the contract rests upon circum-
stances, and should be resolved by the trier of the 
facts." Page 7 49. (Emphasis supplied) 
The court then remanded the case for the trial court 
to determine if the possession of Rupp, the improvements 
made on the property by Rupp, and the obtaining of the 
release for Hill were acts of performance that are re-
ferrable to the contract sought to be enforced as to some 
other agreement or theory. This is a strict application 
of the Grace rule. If these acts were shown on the record 
on appeal to be referrable to any other theory or con-
tract, as the acts of the plaintiff-appellants are in this 
case, then the court would have sustained the District 
Court instead of remanding it for a determination of this 
lSSUe. 
In our case the acts relied upon by the plaintiff-ap-
pellants as constituting partial performance are re-
ferrable to both the contract with Life Assurance Com-
pany of the West and the 2% bonus agreement with 
Hanks. 
The case of Bushn.er v. Bushner, 307 P. 2d 204, cited 
at page 11 of plaintiff-appellants' brief, also applies the 
Grace rule and does not aid the plaintiff-appellants. In 
14 
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that case the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
ruling, denying specific performance of an oral agree-
ment to hold property in trust for the plaintiff and to 
re-convey on demand. This decision was primarily based 
on the fact that the defendant was a trustee of the prop-
erty, had no ownership at all in it, and was using the 
statute of frauds as a defense to his cestiui que trust's 
demand for turnover of the trust property. In addition, 
however the acts of performance between the parties 
could not be referred to any other contract or theory 
other than the oral trust agreement. 
POINT II 
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BY ITS EX-
PRESS TERMS WAS NOT TO BE PER-
FORMED BY EITHER PARTY EARLIER 
THAN THIRTEEN MONTHS FROM THE 
~IAKING OF THE AGREEMENT. THE AL-
LEGED AGREEMENT, THEREFORE, IS 
WITHIN THE COLORADO STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS FOR THIS REASON AND FOR THE 
FURTHER REASON THAT IT IS AN ORAL 
AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF A" THING 
IN ACTION, FOR THE PRICE OF $50.00 OR 
MORE." 
Appellant's contention in Point II that supposed 
full performance of the alleged contract within one year 
by the plaintiffs establishes this alleged contract as not 
within the statute of frauds, is erroneous on three 
grounds. 
First, the pretrial stipulations establish the fact that 
no contract was ever entered into between the parties 
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for the sale of stock, and even if a contract did exist, 
that full performance by any party was impossible for at 
least thirteen months from the date of contract. The 
alleged contract required the plaintiffs to perform two 
acts: (1) remain as salesmen until the completion of 
the public offering, and (2) to render payment for the 
stock. Although the first act was capable of perform-
ance within a one year period, the second act, payment, 
was expressly conditioned by the alleged contract as not 
to be performed for at least thirteen months from the con-
tract date, for the stock was "not to be available for pur-
chase by the plaintiffs prior to May 21, 1962, ... '' (R. 18) 
yet the alleged contract date was April of 1961. Thus, 
according to the express agreement, the plaintiffs could 
not fully perform within a one year period. To say that 
they had the means and made any attempt to tender pay-
ment within a year's period only begs the question. An 
express condition of the agreement ·was that no purchase 
could be made for at least thirteen months from the date 
of the alleged contract. Again none of the cases relied 
upon by the plaintiff-appellants are on point, for in none 
of those cases is there a situation where the parties have 
expressly agreed between themselves that some condi-
tion of the contract will not be performed for at least a 
year. 
Even if any attempt at payment by the plaintiff-
appellants were to be considered, the Colorado statute 
provides that part payment will remove a contract for 
the sale of ''things in action'' from within the statute, 
only when such payment is made "at the time" of the 
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purchase. Colo. Rev. State. 59-1-12(4c). No payment 
was made at the time of this alleged contract. Two of 
the eight plaintiffs tendered payment on March 6, 1962, 
almost a year after the alleged agreement of April 22, 
1961. 
Plaintiff-appellants' contention that the defendant-
respondent himself could have performed within a year's 
period again begs the express conditions of the contract 
and also ignores the defendant-respondent's express 
agreement with Mr. Stewart not to resell the stock be-
fore May 21, 1962. 
Secondly, assuming the existence of a contract, plain-
tiff-appellants' claim of removal from the statute of 
frauds by full performance in completing the sale of 
the public offering within one year flies in the face of 
established Colorado and generally accepted law. This 
rule is stated in Knoff v. Grace, 68 Colo. 527, 190 P. 526, 
528, as follows : 
"What is done as part performance must, to 
escape the statute, be consistent with no theory 
other than that of the alleged oral contract. What 
is fairly referable to some other cause than the 
contract as alleged will not be regarded as suffi-
cient part performance to justify a decree of spe-
cific performance.'' See also, Silver v. Investment 
Securities Co., Ltd., 244 P. 2d 877 and French v. 
Mitchell, 22 P. 2d 644. 
Plaintiff-appellants remaining as salesmen until the 
completion of the public offering is not exclusively re-
ferrable to the alleged contract, as required by the Colo-
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rado rule. This conduct is directly attributable to two 
other agreements; namely to the plaintiff-appellants' em-
ployment agreement with Life Insurance Company of 
the \Vest, and to the plaintiff-appellants' agreement with 
the defendant-respondent under the terms of which the 
plaintiff-appellants were to receive 2% of the gross sales 
in the event they stayed until the end of the public offer-
ing and performed certain other terms. If the court per-
mits this performance to take the contract out of the 
statute of frauds, where this performance is consistent 
with other contracts than the oral contract sought to be 
shown, then the statute of frauds is defeated entirely 
because the plaintiff-appellants, already having obliga-
tions of performance, may fraudulently assert an oral 
contract by setting up the performance they are already 
obliged to give as the performance of the fraudulent con-
tract. The case of Enos v. Anderson, 40 Colo. 395, 93 P. 
475, cited by the plaintiff-appellants in their brief which 
decision permitted the showing of the oral contract where 
full performance was rendered is not precedent for this 
case, for in that case the performance relied upon was not 
referable to any other contract but was exclusively re-
ferable to the oral agreement sought to be enforced. This 
is the proper application of the Grace rule. 
Thirdly, in attempting to avoid the statute of frauds 
the plaintiff-appellants haYe entirely ignored Sec. 
59-1-12( 4) of the Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), which provides: 
"In the following cases e'i·ery agreement shall 
be void, unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing ... 
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( 4) Every contract for the sale of goods, chat-
tels or things in action, for the price of fifty dol-
lars or more .... '' 
Stock is a "thing in action" within the meaning of 
this type statute. Wooley v. Loose, 57 U. 336, 194 P. 908, 
Willies ton on Sales, Sec. 67, page 168. 
The instant case clearly falls, not only within the 
statutory provision relating to agreements not to he per-
formed within one year, but also within the above provi-
sion voiding from the beginning alleged oral agreements 
purporting to convey "things in action" with value in 
excess of fifty dollars. Since plaintiff-appellants' make 
no attempt to avoid this section and since it clearly ap-
plies in the present case, on this basis alone defendant-
respondent is entitled to affirmation of his judgment. 
POINT III 
THE CONTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS THAT THE WRITTEN MEM-
ORANDUM RELATING TO THE 2% BONUS 
COMMISSION REMOVES THE TRANSAC-
TION FROM THE EFFECT OF THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS IS UNTENABLE BECAUSE 
THE MEMORANDUM FAILS TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE COLORADO LAW. 
Plaintiff-appellants under Point III of their brief 
(page 14) propound a theory which has never before 
been urged at any stage of the proceedings or in the 
pleadings. i. e., That the memorandum delivered by Hanks 
to the plaintiff-appellants spelling out the agreement with 
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reference to the 2% bonus comnnsswn is in reality a 
memorandum covering the entire compensation agree-
ment between the parties including the oral agreements 
with reference to the stock which they allege were made 
and which they are seeking to enforce. 
This theory and argument must fail because a memo-
randum to satisfy the statute of frauds must, among 
other requirements, contain all of the essential terms of 
the agreement, including a description of the property 
to which the agreement relates and the consideration to 
be paid and the terms of payment of such consideration. 
A memorandum which fails to contain all of the principal 
terms of the oral contract sought to be enforced is in-
sufficient and does not relieve the oral contract from the 
effect of the statute of frauds. The Restatement of 
Contracts sets forth this rule as follows : 
"TOPIC 7. SUFFICIENCY OF A MEMO-
RANDUM. 
Sec. 207. General Requisites of a Memo-
randum. 
A memorandum, in order to make enforceable a 
contract within the Statute, may be any docu-
ment or writing, formal or informal, signed by the 
party to be charged or by his agent actually or 
apparently authorized thereunto, which states 
with reasonable certainty, 
(a) each party to the contract either bY his 
own name, or by such a description a~ will 
serve to identify him, or by the name or 
description of his agent, and 
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to 
which the contract relates, and 
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(c) the terms and conditions of all the prom-
ises constituting the contract and by whom 
and to whom the promises are made." 
It is obvious that if the courts permitted a memo-
randum to serve as evidence of a contract where the 
terms of the contract are not set out or referred to in 
the memorandum as in this case, the statute of frauds 
would have no effectiveness at all. Any person seeking 
to enforce a fraudulent contract who had another con-
tract with the same person could simply say that the 
written contract was a memorandum of a transaction 
involving an additional contract agreed to orally. The 
courts do not permit the use of such a memorandum to 
avoid the effect of the statute of frauds. Williston defines 
what a memorandum must contain in order to be sufficient 
for purposes of avoiding the statute of frauds. 
''The property to which a sale, or contract to 
sell, relates must be described in the memorandum 
with reasonable certainty. So, although the con-
tract appearing in the memorandum seems to be 
complete upon its face, if, in fact, there are addi-
tional terms, the memorandum is insufficient be-
cause the memorandum must state the essential 
terms of the oral contract.'' Williston on Con-
tracts, Revised Edition, Sec. 575, page 1645. 
The Colorado Supreme Court announced the rule set 
forth in the Restatement and Williston in 1883 in the case 
of Eppich v. Clifford, 6 Colo. 493. This case set forth four 
requirements that must be met by a memorandum seeking 
to avoid the effect of the statute of frauds and held that 
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the failure to meet anyone of these requirements was 
fatal to the memorandum. 
''It has been held under a similar statute that 
the note or memorandum must show on its face, 
or by reference to other writings, first, the names 
of the parties, vendor and vendee ; second, the 
terms and conditions of the contract; third, the 
interest or property affected; and fourth, the con-
sideration to be paid therefore ... Failing in 
either of these requirements it is fatally defec-
tive.'' Eppich v. Clifford, 6 Colo. 493, pages 494 
and 495. 
The 2% contract which the plaintiff-appellants urge 
in their brief as the memorandum of the agreement for 
the sale of stock fails to meet the requirements of the 
Colorado law in the following particulars: (1) It does 
not describe the stock or even refer to the stock. (2) It 
does not contain any of the terms and conditions of the 
alleged contract for the sale of the stock. (3) It does 
not set forth the consideration to be paid for the stock 
or the terms of payment. 
The memorandum, therefore, only meets one of the 
four requirements and is, therefore, in the words of the 
Colorado Supreme Court, "fatally defective." 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUD-
ED FROM CONTENDING ON APPEAL THAT 
THE CONTRACT SOUGHT TO BE EN-
FORCED IS NOT A COLORADO CONTRACT, 





Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the pretrial hearing of the above entitled case 
the parties stipulated that the agreement sought to be 
enforced under the Second Cause of Action of the plain-
tiff-appellants' complaint was made in Colorado: 
'' 6. The parties further agree that on April 
22, 1961, there was an oral agreement between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant, which agreement was 
made at Denver, Colorado." (R. 18.) 
The question of which state law governed with ref-
erence to the alleged agreement sought to be enforced by 
the plaintiff-appellants was considered at length at the 
pretrial and both parties stipulated that the contract was 
made in Colorado and the Colorado law, therefore, would 
apply. It is too late for the plaintiff-appellants, having 
thus stipulated and agreed to this pretrial issue, to at-
tempt to assert that some other law is controlling in order 
to avoid the rule of law adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado. The Utah cases cited under Point IV of plain-
tiff-appellants' brief, therefore, do not apply and should 
not be considered in the determination of the issues 
raised on this appeal. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT 
WHICH COULD ENTITLE THE APPEL-
LANTS TO RELIEF. THE AGREEl\IENT AL-
LEGED WOULD BE VOID FOR INDEFI-
NITENESS IN ANY EVENT AND WOULD BE 
VOID ON THE FURTHER GROUND THAT IT 
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Plaintliff-appellants' contention in Point V that they 
are third-party beneficiaries to the contract between 
Mr. Stewart and defendant-respondent, hereafter re-
ferred to as the supporting contract, providing for the 
acquisition of stock by the defendant-respondent, is er-
roneous on two grounds. 
First, the record clearly shows that no semble nee of 
a third-party beneficiary situation existed. Persons who 
are recognized as having enforceable rights created in 
them by a contract to which they are not parties and for 
which they give no consideration, must qualify as either 
a creditor or a donee beneficiary before such rights are 
enforceable. The plaintiff-appellants fail to qualify as 
creditor (obligee) beneficiaries, for there is no showing 
in the record of an obligation or duty owed by either the 
defendant-respondent or Mr. Stewart to the plaintiff-
appellants, for which obligation or duty the supporting 
contract was supposedly entered into to discharge. For 
a donee beneficiary situation to exist which would be en-
forceable against the defendant-respondent, the follow-
ing situation would have to exist. l\1r. Stewart would 
have to be the donor, intending to carry out his donative 
intent through the defendant-respondent. Then if the 
defendant-respondent failed to deliver the donated stock, 
the plaintiff-appellants might effect recourse against the 
defendant-respondent. See, 4 Corbin, Contracts, 1951, 
Sec. 774-76. But such is not the present case. There 
was no donative intent manifested by Mr. Stewart 
towards the plaintiff-appellants. l\Ir. Stewart sold the 
stock to the defendant-respondent for consideration, 
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thirty-five cents per share. The record only shows, con-
tradictory to plaintiff-appellants' claim in their brief, 
that at the time the supporting contract was being con-
summated, the defendant-respondent, and not Mr. Stew-
art, merely stated that one of his purposes for purchasing 
the stock was to keep his men happy. (R. 351, p. 3, 4, 
Interrogatories 10-15.) If plaintiff-appellants can make 
anything of this fact situation it is only that the defend· 
ant-respondent declared his intention to a third party 
to make an inter-vivos gift, or to at some future time 
enter into some kind of a contractual arrangement with 
the plaintiff-appellants to transfer stock to them. If 
this was a declaration of intent to make an inter-vivos gift, 
then the law clearly is that such is not enforceable. Prom-
ises to make gifts are not enforceable until the subject, or 
some token thereof, is given into the possession of the 
donee. Johnson v. Hilliard, (1945) 113 Colo. 548, 160 P. 
2d 386. Such was never done here. If this is construed 
as a manifestation by the defendant-respondent of an 
intent to enter into a contractual relationship with the 
plaintiff-appellants at some future time, then that con-
tract must be looked to, and as discussed earlier, plaintiff-
appellants' allegation of such a contract is negated by 
reason of the statute of frauds. 
Certainly no contract between the parties to this ac-
tion of either the third-party or direct contractual na-
ture, can be conjured up by reference to this simple mani-
festation of intent to keep his men happy. Even if any 
kind of a contract were found, such would fail because 
of its indefiniteness. The plaintiff-appellants were un-
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aware, at the time of this statement, of the defendant-re-
spondent's intent. Further, there are no conditions or 
duties to be performed, set out or even a price to be paid 
for the stock stipulated. See Wilhelm Lubrication Co. Y. 
Brattrud (1936) 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634. 
Second, this third-party agreement in no way Cir-
cumvents the statute of frauds provisions that, as pre-
viously discussed, are controlling in this case. The 
"chose in action" (stock) which is the subject matter 
of the questioned transaction had a value in excess of 
fifty dollars, thus requiring: (1) a ·signed writing, or (2) 
reception of part of the goods by the buyer, or (3) part 
payment "at the time" of the purchase, to remove this 
alleged agreement from the statute. Colo. Stat. Rev. 
1953, Sec. 59-1-12 ( 4a-c). 
"It is perfectly obvious that third parties have 
no enforceable contractual rights if there is no 
contract.'' 4 Corbin, Contracts, 1951, Sec. 773. 
POINT VI. 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS 
URGED UNDER POINT VI OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS' BRIEF. 
Under Point VI of plaintiff-appellants' brief (page 
18) plaintiff-appellants argue that Hanks promised to 
write a letter spelling out the terms of the agreement 
relating to the stock and says that by reason of this issues 
of fact exists. 
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Even if we should concede that Hanks did so prom-
ise, it is difficult to see how this would raise any issue 
of fact. Such a promise, if made, would be clearly void 
under the Colorado statute of frauds. The Colorado Su-
preme Court so held in the case of Rupp v. Hill, 367 P. 
2d 746: 
''But on the simple question now being consid-
ered, the vast majority of cases hold that a parol 
agreement to reduce to writing a contract which 
is within the statute of frauds is unenforceable. 
A contract that is unenforceable by reason of the 
statute cannot be made indirectly enforceable by 
promising to execute a sufficient memorandum or 
otherwise to satisfy the requirements of the 
statute. 2 Corbin on Contracts 31, Sec. 283.'' 
Rupp v. Hill, 367 P. 2d 746, 749. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-appellants, in their effort to avoid the 
application of the statute of frauds to the alleged agree-
ment which they are seeking to enforce, have resorted to 
untenable theories and to authorities which do not sup-
port their position to the slightest extent. The only au-
thority properly cited is Aesop's Fable (plaintiff-appel-
lants' brief, page 20). The facts of the fable are cor-
rect, but the parties have been confused. The plaintiff-
appellants are the foxes who, having obtained everything 
they bargained for, seek by fraud to secure additional 
compensation. 
The law of Colorado clearly holds that the purported 
agreement would be void even if it was made as they 
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allege. If the plaintiff-appellants had truly made an 
agreement, the burden was upon them to obtain a written 
memorandum as is required by the law of Colorado. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HYDE 
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
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